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Partial deregulation has occurred in a broad range of indus-
tries, from telecommunications to transportation to financial
services.' This first phase of deregulation has given impetus to
an intensive debate over future regulatory policy. Some commen-
tators advocate further partial deregulation of industries such as
natural gas and electric power2 while others push for re-regula-
tion of airlines and railroads.' The immediate question is whether
the deregulation that has taken place will achieve the benefits of
market competition or will create instead imperfect markets that
are neither fish nor fowl, markets that are less efficient than if
they were either fully regulated or fully competitive. The question
arises from the inherent nature of partial deregulation, which
often maintains price controls and other restrictions on incumbent
firms while removing entry barriers. This disparity may cause
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1. See generally REGULATORY R~som: WHAT AcruALLY HAPPENED 1-13 (L. Weiss & M. Klass
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Monopoly? The Case of BVass in Natural Gas Distribution Markets, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 181 (1989);
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by the I.C.C. See M. REAGA. REGULA11oN: THE POLrFiCS OF POLIcy 83 (1987). For an
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NEwswE E, Sept. 12, 1988, at 44.
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entrants to "bypass" established regulated facilities. The results
may be costly duplication of capital facilities, higher prices for
consumers, and paradoxically, an increase in regulation as policy-
makers seek to "manage" the resulting competition.
Markets that are partially deregulated in this way do not
present firms with an equal opportunity to compete. New entrants
to those markets must make irreversible investments in capacity
while incumbent firms already have sunk these costs. However,
incumbent firms face such restrictions as rate regulations, common
carrier obligations, and other limits on their contractual commit-
ments. Furthermore, regulation of access to the established firm's
facilities may operate to subsidize entrants. Efforts by various
regulatory authorities to establish a "level playing field" may
create what we call "incumbent burdens. '4 These are regulatory
constraints that limit an established firm's ability to compete.
Under partial deregulation, then, incumbents cannot compete
freely with entrants.
The social costs of "free" entry with price controls may be very
high. Entrants' investment in large-scale production and transmis-
sion operations can result in costly duplication of facilities.
Competition with entrants may alter regulated rate structures and
create significant welfare losses for captive customers of regulated
firms. Thus, while competitive entry can create benefits for some
customers seeking to bypass established facilities, it is by no
means a costless experiment.
This Article focuses on an assessment of potential costs in
natural gas transmission, although its conclusions apply to partial
deregulation of other industries, particularly electric power
generation and transmission. Part I of this Article examines
bypass and the role of sunk costs. Part II discusses competition
and bypass of established facilities. The benefits and costs of
bypass are noted in Part III and examined using a case study in
Part IV. This Article concludes with recommendations for a
coherent policy toward bypass.
4. See infra Part II.B.
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I. Bypass and Sunk Costs
The term "bypass" denotes entry of an alternate supply source
in a partially deregulated market.- Introducing new capacity may
lower the residual demand that incumbent firms face. Since the
entrant must make irreversible investments in capacity and the
incumbent firms generally possess large-scale transmission and
production facilities, this decreased demand can create substantial
excess capacity. The extent of excess capacity depends on the
investment decisions of entering firms, the existing capital stock,
the growth rate of market demand, and the competitive interac-
tion between entrants and incumbents.
Customers and entering firms can bypass the facilities of
incumbent firms in a variety of ways. In natural gas transmission
and distribution, this can result in duplicate pipeline capacity.
The rapidly evolving market for natural gas has seen a shift in
the role of pipelines away from wholesaling toward unbundled
transportation. An assessment of bypass is required in the newly
deregulated natural gas industry.
A. Capacity, Demand, and Sunk Costs
The size of the existing capital stock in markets facing partial
deregulation reflects decisions made under former regulatory
policies. Capacity choices in regulated markets result from
negotiations between the regulatory authority, the regulated
utility, and customer representatives.' The investment choices of
regulated firms are subject to regulatory approval through
prudency reviews.7 Thus, rate regulation may affect investment
decisions in a number of ways. The well-known Averch-Johnson
analysis raises the possibility that rate-of-return regulation may
bias the relative share of capital investment upward as regulated
5. Bypass is now a common term of art in regulated, and recently deregulated,
industries. Bypass in the natural gas industry is defined as the development of specialized
facilities that circumvent those facilities owned and operated by the local distribution
company (LDC).
6. For a discussion of rate regulation, bargaining, and the role of interest groups,
see D. SPULBEs, REGULATION AND MAtt~rs 267-349 (1989).
7. Commissions generally control investments deemed improper by disallowing them
for ratemaking purposes. See, e.g., Cu. PUB. UTIL. CoDE §§ 454.8, 463 (West 1975 & Supp.
1989).
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firms seek to expand their rate base.' Fuel-use restrictions,
environmental regulations, common carrier obligations, and service
quality or reliability requirements can lead to increases in capital
investment.9
The capacity decisions that regulated firms make also depend
on regulatory contracts assuring the firm cost recovery plus a
rate of return. These regulatory contracts reduce the risks
associated with irreversible investment and therefore may increase
investment" relative to what might have occurred in the absence
of regulation." In some cases, the decision to permit competitive
entry while maintaining controls on the incumbent can be viewed
as a form of regulatory opportunism since the incumbent may not
be able to recover the cost of established facilities. If firms
anticipate that rates will be negotiated downward after they
construct facilities, their incentives to invest in the first place may
be reduced.
Regulatory decisions in the energy sector (electricity and
natural gas) have resulted in capacity levels that generally have
8. Averch & Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory Constraint, 52 AM. EcoN.
RF.v. 1052 (1962). Averch and Johnson show that under certain conditions a larger capital
investment can increase profits when rates of return are constrained.
For a discussion of the technical conditions under which the Averch-Johnson effect
applies, see E. BAILEY., ECONOMIC TEORy OF Rt:GUixroRy CoNs rmmr 125-37 (1973); Baumol
& Klevorick, Input Choices and Rate of Return Regulation: An Overview of the Discussion, 1 BEI.L
J. EcoN. & MGMr. SCI. 162, 163-73 (1970). For a dynamic analysis and discussion of the
empirical literature, see Spulber & Becker, Regulatory Lag and Deregulation with Imperfectly
Adjustable Capital, 6 J. ECON. DYNAMICS & CoMrIol. 137 (1983).
9. Fuel-use restrictions require electric utilities to use a particular fuel such as low-
sulfur fuel oil. Meeting these restrictions may entail additional capital investments. See
Joskow, Inflation and Environmental Concern: Structural Change in the Process of Public Utility
Price Regulation, 17 J.L. & FaN 291, 314-16 (1974).
10. On the other hand, the regulatory process itself may reduce investment levels.
The phenomenon of opportunism identified by Williamson may lead regulators to take
advantage of the sunk costs of regulated firms by setting rates on the basis of operating
expenses. Williamson defines opportunism as "self-interest seeking with guile." 0.
WILLIAMSON, MARxES AND HIEIR.cuis: ANALYSIS AND At-rrrriusr IMPICATIONS 26 (1975).
Opportunism also can lead to the problem of contractual "hold-up" in private contracts.
See Klein, Crawford & Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive
Contracting Process, 21 J.L & ECON. 297, 300 (1978).
11. Rate-of-return regulation, by regulating entry and by assuring investors of the
opportunity to earn the permitted rate of return, reduces the risks associated with
recovering the costs of large-scale, irreversible investment. For a discussion of regulation
as an administered contract, see Goldberg, Regulation and Administered Contracts, 7 BFI.L J.
ECON. 426, 441 (1976). The role of regulation as a means of reducing risks is widely
recognized. See B. OWEN & R. BRARurmCAM, TnE -REGuIXrnON GAME: SIRATGIC USE OF IlI1E
ADMINISTIrIVE PROCESS 239 (1978).
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been viewed as adequate for projected near-term demand levels. 2
Thus, it is relevant to consider whether new entry will create
excess capacity or whether such entry is desirable to meet future
capacity requirements.
There is a fundamental asymmetry in the costs of adjusting
capacity in the regulated transmission industries. Investments in
capacity in transmission facilities are both irreversible and market
specific.'" The investment costs are said to be "sunk" since the
capital cannot generally be sold or transferred to other markets.
Capital equipment in the transmission industries differs from that
used in airlines, trucking, or other transportation enterprises,
where equipment is more easily relocated and adapted to other
uses.'4 Furthermore, capital equipment such as electric transmis-
sion lines or natural gas pipelines differs from capital used in
manufacturing products such as steel and automobiles. In
manufacturing these products, the capital equipment often can be
adapted to vary with the type of product made, and the products
can be transported to a variety of markets far removed from the
location of the factory. Capacity in the transmission industry
cannot be reduced except through abandonment, divestiture, or
depreciation.'" On the other hand, capacity can be increased at
the incremental cost of new construction.
Capacity adjustments must be based on long-term estimates of
customer demand. As is well known from the literature on peak-
load pricing, capacity requirements depend on the rate structure
over time and across customer classes and must be tailored to
meet peak demands. 6 Because capacity is fixed in the short-run,
there will inevitably be both excess capacity and insufficient
capacity relative to short-run demand fluctuations.'7  Steady
increases in the demand for capacity can be met with growth in
12. See ENERGY INFORMATION ADMIN., U.S. DvFpr ov ENERGY, AN ANALYSIS Or FEDiIZAL
ENE.RGY RG.A'rORY COMMISSION (FERC) OitovR 436 at 2 (1986) [hereinafter FERC ANsM.xss].
13. An example of an irreversible, market-specific investment is a pipeline network
that carries natural gas from the field to the city gate of the local distribution company.
The regulatory authority must approve any extension, alteration, and abandonment of
capital once it has been constructed and dedicated to public service. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §
717f(b) (1982) (federal regulation of capital use).
14. P. JosKow & R. ScIIMAi.YNS.I., supra note 2, at 9.
15. See supra note 13.
16. See, e.g., Boiteux, la Tarification des Demands et; Pointe: Application de la Theorie de
la Vente au Cot Marginal, 58 RE~vuE GENERAL.E VE L'EI.EcrRicrrr. 321 (1949). translated as
Boiteux, Peak-Load Pricing, 33 J. Bus. 157, 158 (1960).
17. For theoretical derivations, see Panzar, A Neoclassical Approach to Peak Ioad Pricing.
7 BE .L J. EcoN. 521, 529 (1976).
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the production, storage, and transmission system. The possibility
of decreases in long-run demand for capacity is a cause of great
concern. Large, unanticipated reductions in demand combined
with downward rigidity in capacity can lead to excess capacity.
This excess capacity poses risks for regulated firms since cost
recovery is permitted only for assets that are deemed used and
useful." In many instances, the earnings of regulated firms allow
recovery of capacity costs only after twenty to thirty years of
operation. 9 Reductions in demand can also raise rates for
customers since cost recovery is spread over a smaller customer
base.
Cost recovery considerations aside, it is, of course, inappropri-
ate for a firm to base future investment decisions on the level of
sunk costs. However, it is important to take into account existing
capacity in evaluating whether additional future capacity invest-
ment is required. Particularly because investment in capacity is
irreversible, firms must carefully evaluate the future need for
increases in capacity to avoid making inefficient investments.
Because bypass has the potential to affect capacity levels, its
occurrence has significant implications for the regulatory agenda.
The usefulness of the capacity investment that accompanies new
entry must be an important consideration in evaluating the impact
of proposed regulatory policies toward bypass.
B. Forms of Bypass
Long-term reductions in demand for capacity can take many
forms. The type of bypass that occurs as a consequence of
deregulation may affect the allocation of costs and economic
efficiency in regulated industries as well as future investment
patterns. Customers can choose to bypass the entire production
and transmission system of incumbent firms. Large industrial
customers can relocate to other areas or can connect directly to
a competing system.20 In some cases, this change does not involve
18. Joskow & Schmalensee, Incentive Regulation for Electric Utilities, 4 YALE J. op, Rxo.
1, 4 (1986).
19. Under cost-of-service ratemaking, the regulated firm recovers its invested funds
over the anticipated life of the capital asset. In the case of transmission facilities, expected
service lives can exceed 20 years. See, e.g., Kern River Gas Transmission Company.
Illustrative Twenty-Year Costs of Service (Exhibit No. KR-I0C, FERC Docket Nos. CP85-
437 et al.) (on file with authors).
20. See P. Josiow & R. Schi[siwsEt, supra note 2, at 22-23.
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substantial investment in new capacity by the other system but is
simply the export of excess capacity from one system to another.
In other cases, connection to another transmission system can
involve large-scale investment in new capacity." Other ways of
bypassing production and transmission include fuel-switching and
conservation in response to tax incentives or regulatory restric-
tions."2 For example, in electric power, under the Public Utility
Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA), 5 growth of co-
generation 4 has taken place as a result of regulatory incentives
and subsidies. 5 Bypass can involve particular stages in a vertically
integrated production and transmission sequence." Customers can
bypass the production or wholesale services offered by incumbent
firms by purchasing the regulated firm's transmission services
exclusively.27 Electric utility customers bypass the incumbent
utility's power generation capacity by purchasing bulk wholesale
power from independent generators or from other integrated
utilities and contracting for its transmission on the regulated
firm's lines.2" This practice is known as "wheeling." Natural gas
customers can purchase supplies directly from producers or other
pipelines and obtain transmission services from the regulated
incumbent.' This is known as "contract carriage."
21. An example is given in the natural gas case study in Part IV, infsa.
22. For a discussion of the potential for interfuel substitution in the industrial sector,
see P. McAtvoy, ENERGY POLICY: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 163-89 (1983).
23. Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 2601-
2645 (1982)).
24. Cogeneration refers to the joint production of heat and electric power by
industrial power users. See Joskow, Industrial Cogeneration and Electricity Production in the
United States, in REcuLArOaV REFORm AND Pusuc UTILIMS 63, 65 (M. Crew ed. 1982); Joskow
& Jones, The Simple Economics of Cogeneration, 4 ENERGY J. 1. 2 (1986).
25. Joskow, supra note 24, at 87-96. Cogeneration reduces the demand for capacity
in electricity generation, transmission, and distribution.
26. In some instances, municipalities have sought to acquire the local transmission
network of electric utilities. See, e.g., Application of Pacific Gas and Electric Company and
the City of Redding for an Order Authorizing the Former to Sell and Convey to the Latter
Certain Electric Distribution Facilities (Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm'n Decision No. 85-11-018,
Nov. 6. 1985) (on file with authors).
27. Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines After Partial Wellhead Decontrol, FERC
Order No. 436, 50 Fed. Reg. 42,408 (1985) (to be cod ified at 18 C.F.R. §§ 2, 157, 250,
284, 375, 381) [hereinafter FERC Order No. 436] encourages interstate pipelines to make
capacity available on a nondiscriminatory basis for the private transportation of natural gas.
28. P. Josgow & R. ScHM.LsisEE, supra note 2.
29. See supra note 27.
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C. Bypass in Natural Gas Transmission
Potential bypass in the natural gas industry involves proposals
by new entrants to build new gas pipelines to serve large
industrial customers. The proposed projects involve billions of
dollars in capital outlays for construction of transmission facili-
ties."0 These projects may duplicate existing capacity and raise
costs for pipeline customers as they divert demand from local
distribution companies (LDCs). To place this problem in context,
it is necessary to review not only the changing role of pipeline
firms in the natural gas industry in the 1980s, but also some of
the regulatory developments that have caused this changed role.
Until the early 1980s, pipelines purchased natural gas from
producers under long-term, fixed-price contracts."' The gas was
then resold, also under long-term contracts, to LDCs and large
industrial customers. Thus, the pipeline firms acted primarily as
wholesalers, providing their customers with a combination of
services including transportation, risk-sharing contracts, and
negotiation with producers. As a result of a changing federal
regulatory framework, the 1980s have witnessed a significant
reduction in purchase contracts between pipelines and producers,
and between pipelines and their customers, as sales have declined
and as transportation services have grown."
In the early 1980s, contract carriage represented a small share
of total throughput of gas." By the late 1980s, however, carriage
rose from almost 7 quads to almost 10.9 quads, while total
throughput declined from approximately 19 quads to 16.6
quads." Table 1 details this shift. The share of throughput
devoted to carriage rose from 36% to 66%, displacing sales, which
fell by more than half. The increase in carriage was due to an
30. This will be evident from the case study presented in Part IV, infra, which
analyzes proposals to build new interstate pipelines to serve the enhanced oil recovery
(EOR) market in Kern County. California. For a general statement of the scope of current
FERC proceedings regarding these proposals, see Mojave Pipeline Co., 35 Fed. Energy Reg.
Comm'n Rep. (CCH) 1 61,199 (May 19, 1986) (Docket Nos. CP85-437 et al.) (order
consolidating proceeding for comparative hearing).
31. See ENERGY INFoRMATION ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, WELLHEAD PURCHASES BY
INTERSTATE NATURAL GAS PIPEUNE COMPANIES SINCE THE NGPk TRENDS AND PRofiLEs 3-6 (1988)
[hereinafter WEuLED PuRCA SES].
32. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, ENERGY SECURrrY: A REPORT TO TIE PRESiDENT" OF THE UNITED
STATES 123-24 (1987) [hereinafter ENERGY SEcuRuTY].
33. "Throughput" is a pipeline's total sales and carriage.
34. A "quad" is one quadrillion BTU.
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increase in carriage for distributors, end users, marketers, and
brokers.3 5
Table 136
Sales and Carriage by Interstate
Natural Gas Pipelines
Throughput Sale Share of





This changing role of natural gas pipeline companies is due in
large part to the partial deregulation of wellhead natural gas
under the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 (the NGPA). 7 Market
conditions prior to the enactment of the NGPA and the utility
regulations placed on interstate pipelines have also played a major
role.38
When Congress enacted the NGPA, a complex. set of pre-
existing contracts with suppliers already bound the pipelines."
Pipelines faced contractual obligations for resale that required
them to make additional purchases of gas.40 Rates were subject
to utility regulations that allowed pass-throughs to pipeline
customers of the average costs of purchased gas. 4'1 Furthermore,
pipeline tariffs included both a demand charge and a commodity
charge. These charges were regulated by state agencies for
35. See ursmmTATE NA-aA.L GAs Ass'N o Am., CARAGE TiouGHi 1987 2 (INGAA Issue
Analysis). Carriage for other pipelines fell slightly over the period.
36. Id. at Appendix A, Table A-2.
37. Pub. L. No. 95-621, 92 StaL 3352 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3342 (1982)).
38. P. Mm.Avoy, TIn REGuLATED INDusRIEs 105-11 (1979).
39. Id.
40. ENERGY SEcUtrrY, supra note 32, at 123.
41. A. TUSSING & C. BAM.ow, TimE NATUMRA GAS INUS'rRY: EVoLUTION, STRUCURE AND
EcoNoMics 60 (1984).
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intrastate commerce" and by the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) for interstate commerce." The demand and
commodity charges acted as a two-part tariff, with the demand
charge serving as the fixed fee and the commodity charge as a
per-unit price. Pipelines were able to pass on a portion of fixed
and variable costs through the demand charge. This was referred
to as the "minimum bill," since customer payments included both
the demand charge and any additional commodity charges for
purchased gas."
Pipelines also held long-term contracts with natural gas
producers.4 ' These contracts had two interrelated provisions that
created substantial difficulties in the wake of the NGPA. First,
contracts between pipelines and producers contained "take-or-pay"
provisions that required a minimum payment for gas whether or
not the pipeline took deliveries.4 Such contract terms provided
for sharing of market risks between suppliers and pipelines,
ensuring revenues to producers and gas supplies to the pipeline.
Second, the contracts contained escalator or "most-favored nation"
clauses that tied the contract price of gas to the price paid in the
particular location of the natural gas field . 7 This type of clause
was meant to ensure that contract prices for gas reflected market
prices. The escalator clause effectively tied the minimum payments
set by take-or-pay provisions to the market price of gas. Unfortu-
nately, the escalator clause functions as a ratchet mechanism,
increasing the pipeline's obligation to pay when market prices
rise, but not permitting downward adjustments if market prices
fall. While energy prices may be expected to follow a long-term
upward trend given scarce supplies and limited discoveries of new
42. For a discussion of state commission rate authority over investor-owned utilities,
see NAT'L ASS'N OF REGULATORY COMM'NS, 1987 ANNUAL REPORT ON UruT.r REGULATION 397-98
(1988).
43. The Natural Gas Act of 1938, ch. 556, 52 Stat. 821 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 717-717w (1982)) required regulation of interstate pipeline companies by the
Federal Power Commission. In 1977, many of the powers of the Federal Power Commission
were vested in the new Federal Department of Energy.
44. The Federal Power Commission introduced minimum bills in pipeline ratemaking
in 1958. See ENERGY INFORMATION ADMIN., U.S. Du'T OF ENERGY, A STUDY OF CoNTRAc~s BErWEN
IbNTERsTAT PIPEUNES AND THEIR CusTomt.s 21-23 (1984) [hereinafter STUDY OF COMrT.AMI.
45. Id. at 27.
46. Id. at 26-28.
47. Id. at 34-35.
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deposits," large fluctuations may still occur, with long periods of
constant or falling prices. 9
It is in this market setting, within a network of existing
contracts, that the NGPA took effect. Pipeline companies,
anticipating future gas shortages and faced with contractual
obligations for resale, sought to increase contractual purchases of
gas.50 The partial deregulation of wellhead prices under the
NGPA created pricing categories for gas that differed on the basis
of production methods, the presence or absence of prior interstate
or intrastate contracts, and other factors. Generally speaking, the
gas was classified as "old gas," "new gas," and "high-cost gas,"'"
although a large number of subcategories existed. The multiple
price categories and the purchasing policies of many pipelines
created severe distortions in wellhead prices. Because pipelines
were able to recover the average cost of purchased gas, some
pipelines bid up the cost of new and deregulated deep gas to
levels substantially above market prices.5 The high-cost supplies
were then averaged or "rolled in" with their existing low-cost
supplies. Due to take-or-pay provisions and most-favored nation
clauses, many pipelines saw their contractual obligations soar as
a result of the high bids for gas placed by other pipelines."'
Consequently, those pipelines with smaller cushions of old gas
faced relatively higher average gas purchase costs.
For a significant number of pipelines, the average cost of gas
rose above the market price of gas, creating serious financial
consequences." In many instances, pipelines attempted to
renegotiate contracts to reduce contract prices to market levels.3
48. ENERGY SFcuRn-y, supra note 32, at 25.
49. See Am. GAS Ass'N, 1987 GAS FAcIs 109 (1987).
50. A. TussiNo & C. BARI.OW, supra note 41, at 228-29.
51. These terms are defined in the NGPA. "Old gas" is defined in 15 U.S.C. § 3314
(1982) (gas dedicated to interstate commerce before NGPA) and 15 U.S.C. § 3316 (1982)
(rollover contracts). "New gas" is defined in 15 U.S.C. §§ 3312. 3313, 3318, 3319 (1982).
"High-cost gas" is defined in 15 U.S.C. § 3317 (1982), which also deals with "deep gas."
Deep gas is gas from wells producing from more than 15,000 feet. See WELLIFAD PURCLASES,
supra note 31, at 13-24.
52. WFaIiFAD PURChuArS, supra note 31, at 16.
53. Id. at 28-32.
54. Take-or-pay contract obligations reached $10 billion for the natural gas industry
by the end of 1986. Wald, Gas Producers See an End to DisTutes with Pipelines, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 7. 1988, at DI, col. 1. See also SruuY oF CoNrmcrs, supra note 44, at 43.
55. Wellhead prices for natural gas under long-term contract were renegotiated under
special renegotiation clauses. See ENERGY INFORMAI'ON AvMIN., U.S. DEp'"' OF ENKRGY, AN
ANALYSIS OF NAIURAL GAS CogiiRAcIs, VoLUxM III: ComurAcr PROVISIONS COVERING PRODUCrIION
OF Nizw GA 7-11 (1987) [hereinafter ANm.vsis OF CoN-ritcJs]. As a basis for pricing of 1984
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A large number of contract disputes led to litigation as pipelines
sought to reduce take-or-pay obligations.58 Pipelines holding
contracts with "market-out" clauses exercised their option to
curtail supplies priced above market levels.5 7
Further regulatory changes, aimed at enhancing market
efficiency in response to the chaotic pricing and contract situation,
have also occurred. On the customer side, FERC sought to curtail
recovery of take-or-pay costs through minimum bills for cus-
tomers, as a means of making pipelines more responsive to
purchased gas costs.58 On the supplier side, FERC acted to
implement common carrier regulations and alleviate take-or-pay
obligations." Under these new rules, interstate pipelines offering
contract carriage must act as common carriers.
Adequate supplies of natural gas have resulted from rising gas
prices in the 1980s.61 The higher contract prices have reduced gas
purchases, leading to a smaller demand base, excess pipeline
capacity, and further wholesale and retail price increases." The
combination of excess supplies of gas at the field and excess
pipeline capacity has opened the way for increased spot market
allocation of gas. Also, the contractual problems faced by pipelines
create incentives for pipelines to decrease their role as wholesalers
and to increase their role as transporters of gas. The share of
transport relative to sales can be expected to rise still further as
FERC continues to implement common carrier regulations." The
production from post-NGPA wells in July 1985, renegotiation occurred for 21.4% of new
gas whose price was decontrolled before January 1, 1985 and for 18.7% of gas whose price
was decontrolled after January 1, 1985.
56. For a discussion of the exercise of pricing mechanisms and contract terms, see
id. at 52 ("Market-out and force majeure actions account for the pricing mechanism for
37 percent of all new gas in 1985.").
57. Id. at 10-11.
58. Elimination of Variable Costs from Certain Natural Gas Pipeline Minimum
Commodity Bill Provisions, FERC Order No. 380, 49 Fed. Reg. 22,778 (1984), prohibited
recovery of take-or-pay payments through minimum bills. For an extensive analysis of
minimum bill provisions, see STiDV op Cop-rRAcrs, supra note 44, at 21-36.
59. FERC Order No. 436, supra note 27, allowed pipelines to pass on the costs of
buying out of take-or-pay provisions. Also, certification was eased for pipelines acting as
common carriers. Block pricing replaced average or rolled-in pricing. Regulation of Natural
Gas Pipelines after Partial Wellhead Decontrol, FERC Order No. 500, 52 Fed. Reg. 30,334
(1987) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. §§ 2, 284) [hereinafter FERC Order No. 500] amended
certain provisions of FERC Order No. 436.
60. "Excess deliverability in 1985 was estimated at about 2 to 3 trillion cubic feet."
ApArvsis oF Co TrAcrs, supra note 55, at 4. See also ENERGV I'oaM'roN Aouwm., U.S. DEP'T
OF ENERGY, ANUAL ENuL.y OuTLooiv 1985 36 (1986).
61. See WELLHEA PUiCtASFS, supra note 31, at 35.
62. Id. at 39-42.
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dramatic replacement of sales by contract carriage shifts the focus
of interstate pipeline firms away from the provision of wholesale
services toward the supply of transportation services. The
deregulation of field prices of natural gas and the easing of
certification requirements for pipelines has created opportunities
for competitive entry and bypass. An evaluation of competition
and regulatory policy must begin with a comparison of the
relative costs and regulatory constraints that incumbent firms and
potential entrants face.
II. Bypass and Competition
It is misleading to portray competitive entry into regulated
markets using textbook models of competitive or perfectly
contestable markets. The entrant faces two significant entry
barriers not present in either of these models: the sunk costs
required for entry and regulatory restrictions. The incumbent
also faces regulatory constraints that rarely have been addressed
in the economics and legal literatures. To emphasize the impor-
tance of these constraints on established firms, we refer to them
as incumbent burdens. An accurate picture of competition in
partially deregulated markets requires a careful assessment of both
entry barriers and incumbent burdens.
A. Entry Barriers
The literature on regulation and industrial organization has
focused attention on the consequences of barriers to the entry
of new firms."' George Stigler defines barriers to entry as costs
incurred by entrants but not borne by incumbent firms.64 The
principal entry barrier results from the need to make market-
specific, irreversible investments in capacity upon entry. The
incumbent, having already made such investments, is said to have
a cost advantage over the entrant; the incumbent's future
decisions depend on expected revenues and operating costs and
need not reflect sunk costs.6 5 This is not necessarily the case in
63. See J. BMN. BARRIERS TO NEw COmpuTiON (1956); D. SPuLnER, supra note 6; G.
STIGLER, TiUE ORGANK7ATION OF INDUStRY (1968); von Weizsacker. A Welfare Analysis of Barriers
to Entry, 11 BELL J. ECON. 379 (1980).
64. G. STnLER, supra note 63, at 216-29.
65. W. BAUMOL, J. PANZAR & R. WiLuj, CONTEfsIADLE MARKETS AND THiE TimoRy OF
INDUsTRY STRUcruRE 279-303 (1982).
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regulated markets where cost recovery is built into the regulatory
process. Entering firms, not yet having incurred construction or
set-up costs, must base their entry decision on their ability to
recover both construction and operating costs. The incumbent's
advantage in a competitive market stems from the possession of
available capacity and from an ability to set prices based solely on
operating expenses. A firm will undertake the risk of entry only
if expected prices cover both capital expenditures and operating
expenses. The other principal entry barrier stems from entry
regulations rather than technology. Utility regulations impose
certification requirements on new entrants. 66 Meeting specific
federal and state criteria can raise the costs of entry.
Long-term contracts can address the problem of cost recovery
in both competitive and regulated markets. The risks associated
with irreversible investment can be shared -with customers if an
entrant can secure long-term contracts before constructing new
facilities.67 The gas industry has traditionally used twenty-year
contracts between suppliers and pipelines and between pipelines
and their customers.68 Established firms, both interstate pipelines
and LDCs, have the advantage of extensive transmission facilities.
Although long-term contracts alleviate sunk cost entry barriers,
another barrier can be created by regulatory requirements that
entrants obtain service contracts covering 100% of capacity costs.
6
These reporting restrictions have been relaxed significantly under
FERC Order No. 500.70 A pipeline entering without contractual
assurances or, as was generally the case, letters of intent, faces
greater risk but bears lower costs of complying with entry
regulations.
Economic policy analysts have advocated regulatory efforts
directed at removing barriers to entry." Regulatory actions have
increased access to facilities in industries with large sunk costs by
imposing common carrier obligations and regulating rates. In
natural gas, these regulations require contract carriage on existing
66. Certification requirements are discussed in P. M .Avoy. supra note 22, at 123.
67. The capital construction costs of new interstate pipelines can reach into the
hundreds of millions of dollars. See infra Part IV.
68. Wv.uaiv..u PuaciuAsF, supra note 31, at 1.
69. Sruvy oF Com-Lrcis, supra note 44, at 3-5. 40-43.
70. FERC Order No. 500, supra note 59.
71. See, e.g., P. JosKow & R. ScIHAINSEE, supra note 2, at 199-221; Bailey & Baumol,
Deregulation and the Theoy of Contestable Markets, I YALE J. oN REG. 111 (1984).
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pipelines." Similar phenomena exist in electricity (wheeling),"
railroads (trackage rights),74  and telecommunications (equal
access)." Regulatory authorities and intervenors who seek to
assure competitive access to established production and transmis-
sion capacity have characterized these facilities as "bottlenecks" or
"essential facilities. 76
In natural gas markets, such efforts at reducing entry barriers
can be expected to increase competition in wholesale markets for
gas while causing interstate pipelines to act primarily as transpor-
tation companies rather than as wholesalers. The natural gas
industry has experienced growth in spot market trading and
witnessed the entry of independent brokerage." As the transmis-
sion segment of the industry becomes more competitive, it is
important to assess the consequences for LDCs. In most cases,
LDCs are separate entities devoted to distributing and marketing
gas.78 The issue is whether LDCs can compete effectively with
interstate pipelines for large industrial customers. An LDC's ability
to compete depends in large part on the extent of regulations
that create incumbent burdens.
72. See WELLEAD PuRcHAsEs, supra note 31, at 40-41.
73. Wheeling involves the provision of transmission services in the wholesale electricity
industry. See Feb & Heaps, Compuksoty Wheeling of Electric Power to Industrial Consumers, 52
FoRnDue L. REv. 219, 220 (1983); Norton & Early, Limitations on the Obligation to Provide
Access to Electric Transmission and Distribution Lines, 5 ENERGY L.J. 47 (1984); Pace, Wheeling and
the Obligation to Serve, 8 ENERGY LJ. 265 (1987); Pace & London, Introducing Competition into
the Electric Utility Industry: An Economic Appraisal, 3 ENERGY L.J. 1, 14-16 (1982). See generally
P. JosKow & R. Sc msAusEE, supra note 2.
74. Trackage rights refers to the granting of access to the track owned by a "host"
railroad to the trains of another railroad. See Tye, Post-Merger Denials of Competitive Access
and Trackage Rights in the Rail Industy, 53 TaANsp. PRAc. J. 413, 427 (1986).
75. See MacAvoy & Robinson, Losing by judicial Policymaking: The First Year of the AT&T
Divestiture, 2 Y .E J. oN RG. 225, 258 (1985).
76. On bottlenecks and the essential facility doctrine, see Tye, Competiive Access: A
Comparative Indus"r Approach to the Essential Facility Doctrine, 8 ENERGY LJ. 337 (1987); Note,
Unclogging the Bottleneck- A New Essential Faciliy Doctrine, 83 CoLM. L. REv. 441 (1983).
77. A. TUSSING & C. BAs.ow, supra note 41, at 183-84.
78. See Pierce, Reconsidering the Roles of Regulation and Competition in the Natural Gas
Industry, 97 HARav. L. Rxv. 345, 348 (1983); Note, Freeing the Captives: Nondiscriminatory Access
to Transportation in the Interstate Natural Gas Market. 47 U. PiTr. L. REv. 843 (1986).
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B. Incumbent Burdens
1. Rate Regulation
The incumbent firm facing entry as the result of partial
deregulation is constrained in its price responses to competition.
In many instances, because the incumbent confronts pricing
restrictions that are not placed on a potential entrant,79 rate
regulation can be an incumbent burden. This difference in
restrictions may be due to jurisdictional conflict between regula-
tory authorities."0 Uneven application of price regulations may also
result from regulators' attempts to "level the playing field" by
counteracting perceived entry barriers."
If the incumbent utility is unable to offer competitive prices
to potential bypassers, the market outcome will not necessarily
promote efficiency. The rates chosen by the regulated firm reflect
regulatory restrictions rather than true costs. Thus, entry
deterrence (or accommodation) need not indicate that the
incumbent (or entrant) possesses superior technology or cost
efficiency. Rather, the competitive outcomes reflect the extent to
which incumbent burdens are relatively more or less restrictive
than entry barriers. In addition to limiting rate charges, rate
regulation also allocates costs across customer classes."' In practice,
costs must be allocated between captive customers, who are
generally residential or commercial, and switching customers.
Regulators set rates to allow recovery of operating costs plus
a reasonable rate of return on capital or rate base.8 Therefore,
sunk costs, not avoidable or incremental costs, determine prices.
The cost recovery feature of rate regulation fundamentally distorts
79. D. SPULBER, supra note 6, at 617-24.
80. LDCs in natural gas are subject to state regulation while interstate pipelines are
subject to FERC regulation. See supra notes 42 and 43.
81. FERC imposed rates under FERC Order No. 500, supra note 59, that were
designed "to allow a level playing field' among pipeline competitors," WEaLtDo PURCIIASEs,
supra note 31, at 41. In telecommunications, Judge Stephen G. Breyer points out that the
FCC has handicapped AT&T by (1) maintaining higher access charges on AT&T for local
service; (2) keeping a "price umbrella" over AT&T's competitors; and (3) imposing
additional administrative requirements on AT&T for tariff filings. Breyer, Antitrust,
Deregulation, and the Newly Liberated Marketplace, 75 CAuF. L. REv. 1005, 1022-24 (1987). See
also MacAvoy & Robinson, supra note 75, at 258.
82. D. SPULBFR. supra note 6, at 200-32.
83. See I A. KmN, TiuE ECONOMICS ov R.uuAION: PRINCIPLES AND INsTrrtrnoNs 45-51.
113-14 (1971). Operating costs include variable costs, taxes, and depreciation. The rate
base consists of total capital expenditures less accumulated depreciation.
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pricing decisions. More important, the behavior of regulated firms
is not comparable to that of competitive firms that price by
equating marginal revenues and marginal costs. The regulated
firm cannot reduce prices to the level of operating costs since it
must recover rate base expenditures. Valuation of the rate base
using historical costs, rather than replacement costs, increases the
distortion. 4 Given various depreciation rules, the book value of
capital for the regulated firm may exceed its economic value, thus
further increasing the mark-up above the operating cost needed
for cost recovery.8 5
Another important restriction on price competition arises when
the rate structure is based on cost allocation rules. The cost
allocation between captive and switching customers is not at issue.
The problem is the restriction on the incumbent firm's ability to
price competitively to those customers seeking to bypass. Selective
entry can occur if the rate structure is not sustainable, leading to
higher industry costs if capacity is duplicated.
The existence of subsidies across customer classes creates
incentives for bypass." A rate structure involves cross-subsidies if
the revenues from any specific service or customer class exceed
the stand-alone costs of providing these services. 7 Cross-subsidies
84. See P. MArAvoY, supra note 22, at 123-26.
85. Id. at 124-25.
86. A monopoly offering a rate structure with cross-subsidies is not sustainable against
new entry. See W. BAUMOL, J. PAzA & R. WILLIG, supra note 65, at 202-03.
87. The identification of cross-subsidies has a long history. Cross-subsidies exist when
revenues from a service fail to cover its incremental cost, where the incremental cost of a
particular service equals the total cost of a group of services net of the stand-alone cost of
that service. Baumol traces the history of the "incremental cost test" for cross-subsidies back
to Hadley. W. BALMOL, Su uRiurNss 113-15 (1986). Baumol cites W. AcWORTH, THE RAILWAYS
AND THE TRADERS (1891); E. ALxAWDER, RAILWAY PRAcriCE (1887); A. HA LEY, RAxLoAD
TRA.SPOaTATION (1886).
An equivalent test for the absence of cross-subsidies, when total revenues equal total
costs, is to require the revenues from each service not to exceed their stand-alone cost.
See Faulhaber, Cross Subsidization: Pricing in Public Enterpise, 65 AM. ECON. REV. 966. 971
(1975). The requirement that revenues cover costs is certainly a basic principle. The
requirement that revenues not exceed stand-alone costs recognizes that cost savings may be
obtained by joint production so that it is sufficient for revenues to cover incremental costs.
Let R1 and R1 be the revenues from services I and 2. Let C represent the total costs of
providing the services jointly, and let C' and C represent the stand-alone costs of the two
services. Rate regulation requires that the firm break even, R1 + R2 = C. The stand-alone
cost test finds an absence of cross-subsidies ifi
R' < C', R! < C'.
Given the zero-profit condition, this is equivalent to the incremental cost test:
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may result from regulatory policies designed to provide income
transfers across customer classes. For example, such subsidies may
run from industrial to small commercial customers. Cross-subsidies
can also result from second-best Pareto-optimal pricing, also
known as Ramsey pricing."' Selective entry can occur if the rate
structure is not sustainable, leading to higher industry costs if
capacity is duplicated.
Even if the incumbent firm is partially deregulated and allowed
to price competitively to a segment of the market, the portion of
costs that can be recovered in the regulated segment of its market
will continue to restrict its pricing decisions. Joint costs may not
be easily attributable, although in industries such as natural gas,
transmission costs are a small share of total costs. s9 The partially
regulated firm may also have an incentive to shift costs to the
regulated market segment, where cost recovery is assured.
2. Vertical Rate Structure
A significant feature of partial deregulation concerns regulated
pricing of access to a transmission network." The effect of
contract carriage in natural gas, wheeling in electricity, or
trackage rights for railroads is to unbundle transmission from the
set of services provided by the incumbent firm. Distortions in
transmission access prices can lead to inefficient purchasing
decisions that can have long-run consequences for industry
structure.
In the natural gas industry, regulators are attempting to
separate the transportation function of pipelines from the
marketing function of the downstream affiliates." The pipelines
are becoming common carriers under FERC Orders No. 436 and
R> C - C1, R' > C - C ,
where C - C' is the incremental cost of good 2 and C - C2 is the incremental cost of good
1.
88. See infra note 118. The pursuit of optimal pricing is addressed in Part III, infra.
89. Based on an analysis of 25 interstate pipeline companies, the Energy Information
Administration estimates that transmission costs account for less than 14% of total costs. See
FERC AN.vsis, supra note 12, at C-2 to C-3.
90. Competition and pricing of access to a network are examined by Panzar,
Sustainability, Efftieny, and Vertical Integration, in REGULATED INDUSrIES AND PUBUC ENT'ERaREis:
EUROPFAN AND UNrrZD STATES PEsPWTrwEs 171 (B. Mitchell & P. Kleindorfer eds. 1979)
[hereinafter R~cuLATo INDUsrRIES); Willig, The Theory of Net ork Access Pricing, in IssuEs Km
Pusuc UTILrrY RZGULATtON 109 (H. Trebing ed. 1979).
91. See Note, supra note 78, at 856.
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500, having already had their upstream role as wholesale
purchasers of gas diminished.9 2 An important issue facing this
industry is whether fully separating the pipeline from its market-
ing function is also efficient. Although it is evident that pipelines
face competition in marketing natural gas, there may be econo-
mies from participation in both marketing and transportation of
gas. These economies, referred to as economies of sequence,"3 yield
cost savings from vertical integration. Therefore, the regulated
prices of unbundled transport service must be carefully chosen.
If the price of transport is set too high, there will be incentives
for the construction of duplicative transmission facilities that
bypass the existing pipeline. If the regulated price of transporta-
tion is too low and cost recovery relies on retail prices, customers
will have an incentive to bypass the pipeline's marketing affiliate.
Customers will rely on independent brokers or marketers to
transport gas over the pipeline. The loss of retail revenues and
the increased volume of gas under contract carriage would create
financial difficulties for the pipeline unless it readjusts its
transport charges."
3. Obligation to Serve and Service Quality
The incumbent utility may be saddled with regulations that
impose an obligation to serve or mandate a certain level of
service quality. 5 To the extent that entrants escape such regula-
tions, the obligation to serve acts as an incumbent burden.
Moreover, potential bypassers can have all the benefits of new
entry without losing the backup facilities of established capacity.
The common carrier obligation of regulated incumbents
requites additional investment in production or transmission
capacity. Coupled with the cost recovery and cost allocation
provisions of rate regulation, this obligation can further bias
pricing decisions of the incumbent and raise prices further above
incremental costs. Competitive firms can adjust both prices and
92. See id.; Lambert, Bypass in the Natural Gas Industry: The Fruit of Regulatory Change,
PUs. UTIL. FORT., Apr. 3, 1986, at 11.
93. The term is introduced in D. Spui.xvt, supra note 6, at 113. Fconomies of sequence
refer to the cost savings achieved by combining stages in a production sequence.
94. Even more complicated issues arise in connection with the vertical integration of
generation, transmission, and distribution in the electric power industry.
95. On common carrier obligations in natural gas, see A. KAuN, supra note 83, at 5-
7. 156-58.
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capacity; an incumbent faced with common carrier obligations is
ultimately restricted in its ability to price competitively.
The common carrier obligation confers an additional advantage
on the entrant. The bypassing customer gains costless insurance
from the incumbent's facilities that provide backup service to the
entrant's service. These backup services are available on a stand-
by basis at little or no chargeY6 Thus, service quality improve-
ments result from the combination of new entry with the
incumbent's existing facilities. The bypassing customer's willingness
to pay for new capacity reflects the total value of capacity since
the full resource costs are not incurred. Under obligation-to-serve
regulations and curtailment priorities, a bypassing customer can
be assured of receiving supplies from the incumbent pipeline even
during a shortage.97 This could have unintended consequences.
If the pipeline had reduced its purchases and well contract-
ing strategy because of the load loss of the partial require-
ments customers, it would seem ironic that the partial
requirements customer could become the prodigal son and
return to preempt the captive customers because of a
difference in its end-use mix (i.e., higher priority users
under curtailment rules).98
The service quality restrictions faced by an incumbent can also
act as an incumbent burden. The incumbent may be required to
offer firm service99 for residential customers and interruptible
service"'0 for industrial customers. Thus, an entering pipeline may
have a competitive advantage by being able to offer firm service
to industrial customers. In this regard, note that an incumbent
96. This is due to the fact that the incumbent's pipeline facilities are an irreversible
investment. Therefore, due to common carrier regulations, these facilities remain available
to all customers of the incumbent. For additional discussion, see S'ruoy o Cov.owrs, supra
note 44, at 27.
97. Id. at 30. 55-57.
98. Id. at 57. Load loss refers to reduced purchases by customers. End-use mix refers
to the customer's uses for gas. Curtailment rules are regulations that spell out priorities for
the restriction of supplies to particular classes of customers in the event of temporary
observed shortages of natural gas.
99. Firm service refers to contracts that do not allow for interruptions in service
except perhaps in emergencies.
100. Interruptible service refers to contracts that explicitly allow for interruptions in
or curtailment of service under specified conditions in which shortages arise.
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firm's investment decisions are subject to regulatory approval.'
Prudency reviews may restrict capacity expansion to improve the
incumbent's service while certification of entrants may involve
other criteria administered by a different agency.
4. Long-Term Contracts
The regulated incumbent may be at a substantial disadvantage
in its ability to enter into long-term contracts with its customers.
Contractual agreements may be subject to revision or abrogation
by the state regulatory commission.' An entrant subject to
federal regulation may have greater latitude in making contractual
commitments.' 0 s For this reason, contractual restrictions can act as
an incumbent burden.
The availability of assured supplies may be of value to
industrial customers. The ability of entrants to offer long-term
contracts can create incentives for bypass. As noted above,
contracts also play a role in mitigating investment risks. Thus,
entrants' ability to enter into long-term contracts reduces the
potential barriers associated with the cost of new facilities. Given
the increasing importance of spot prices for gas and the role of
pipelines as transporters, contracts may not play an important
role in the near future. However, the inability of incumbent firms
to offer long-term contracts may be a factor causing customers to
seek access to spot markets for gas.
5. Conflicts among Regulators
Bypass often can result in conflicts among regulators. Incum-
bent firms generally are subject to state regulation while bypassers
are often subject only to federal regulation. For example, in
natural gas markets, state commissions regulate the LDCs °4 while
FERC regulates interstate pipelines offering bypass services." 5
101. Regulatory approval is required to obtain a certificate. See 15 U.S.C. § 717f
(1982).
102. Most jurisdictions require that utility contracts expressly be made subject to
future commission modification. See, e.g., Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, Rules Governing the
Filing and Posting of Schedules of Rates, Rules and Contracts, General Order 96-A, §§ IX
and X (Jan. 2, 1962) (on file with authors).
103. This is due to the efforts of FERC to promote competition. See Hesse, A New
Era in Energy Regulation, PUB. UTIL. Fowr., Mar. 16, 1989. at 19.
104. See, e.g., CAl. PUB. UIIL. Co, §§ 216(a), 222, 701 (West 1965 & Supp. 1989).
105. 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (1982).
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Some economists have argued that competitive entry is a mecha-
nism for changing regulatory policy.106 They view federal regula-
tion as a means both of increasing market competition and of
forcing state commissions to remove restrictions on incumbent
firms. Indeed, Broadman and Kalt have asserted that competition
between regulators can create economic benefits." 7 This is, in our
view, neither good economics nor desirable regulatory policy.
Competition between firms subject to different regulatory restric-
tions cannot be expected to yield the same level of economic
efficiency as would competitive markets with free entry. In
competitive markets, the success of firms is related to cost
efficiencies, competitive pricing and marketing, and product
quality. The success of firms in a regulated industry may simply
reflect the pattern of entry barriers and incumbent burdens
established by regulators. The winners need not be the best
competitors; they may be those firms favored by unequal regula-
tory benefits.
Competition between regulatory authorities is also undesirable.
Certainly, one cannot compare an industry regulated by compet-
ing regulatory agencies with Adam Smith's description of a
competitive market. Conflicting regulatory jurisdictions do not
correspond to the "invisible hand" of competition under which
consumers and firms pursue economic objectives. The conse-
quences of competing regulations can include increased regulatory
intervention in markets, greater administrative costs, and unneces-
sary delays in certification of new entrants. Variation across
jurisdictions can lead to uncertainty about which rules are
applicable in specific markets and can increase risk and compli-
ance costs for regulated firms. Hybrid forms of competition
involving administrative agencies can only create market uncer-
tainty. Economic efficiency arises from competition between firms
that are able to make unrestricted business decisions.
The relative levels of entry barriers and incumbent burdens
determine the extent of competitive entry and the resulting
industry structure. It is important to observe that the market
provides a mechanism through which firms can overcome entry
barriers and incumbent burdens. Incumbents and potential
entrants can form contractual agreements that compensate for
cost differences. Joint ventures allow incremental industry capacity
106. Broadman & Kalt, supra note 2. at 204-06.
107. Id.
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to reflect anticipated future demand while avoiding unwanted
duplication of facilities in both production and transmission. Also,
joint ventures allow the industry to develop rate structures and
customer contract terms that are adjusted to the needs and
demand elasticities of various customer classes. A joint venture
can have greater flexibility in choosing prices, products, and
sources of input supplies, particularly if the incumbent and
entrant face different regulatory constraints. Therefore, it is to be
expected that in the presence of entry barriers and incumbent
burdens, joint ventures will be created for the purposes of
marketing and capacity expansion.
III. Benefits and Costs of Bypass
Competition among firms is the driving force behind the
allocative efficiency of market economies." 8 Competition creates
efficient prices, product quality and variety, and technical
innovation. Under the right market conditions, price and entry
deregulation in regulated utility industries can achieve the
benefits of competition. However, if only partial deregulation
occurs, the remaining restrictions on the behavior of entrants
and incumbents can lead to market outcomes that are less
efficient than those in a fully regulated regime.
A. Competition and Efficiency
Partial deregulation can lead to more administrative interven-
tion in markets. As regulators seek to manage competition or to
level the playing field, regulatory activities can increase. To
counter perceived entry barriers, incumbent burdens are imposed,
limiting the established firms' ability to compete. Disguised
subsidies to entry may be provided."' To the extent that regula-
tory activities persist after entry controls are lifted, it is impossible
to make predictions about the market outcome using models of
competitive markets. Managed competition can lead to distorted
prices, inefficient product quality, and insufficient or excess
investment levels. Therefore, although competition is desirable,
that goal need not lead to the conclusion that all entry barriers
in the utility industry should be removed. A case-by-case review
108. G. STIGLzz, THE THEORY OF PRICE 178-80 (3d ed. 1967).
109. D. SPULBER, supra note 6, at 617-24.
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of the conditions for competition must be completed before lifting
entry restrictions.
Some have argued that partial deregulation is an effective
strategy for regulators seeking to learn about new technology and
production costs."' They contend that partial deregulation can be
used to allow selective entry so that information is gained from
observation of the resulting market equilibrium. After information
about new technology is obtained, new regulations can be
imposed to take advantage of the acquired knowledge."' Gather-
ing information is certainly an important feature of the regulatory
process, and partial deregulation undoubtedly provides a rich
source of observations about new technology, firm costs, prices,
and contractual agreements. However, it is a very costly source
of information. Partial deregulation can be an expensive and
irreversible experiment, particularly if entry involves large sunk
costs."' For this reason, partial deregulation appears to be an
unwise policy choice.
What criterion should be used to evaluate changes in regula-
tory policy? In theory, economists generally favor the criterion of
Pareto optimality. An economic allocation is Pareto optimal if
there does not exist another allocation that makes some individu-
als better off without making any individual worse off. This
criterion is useful for making an initial selection among all
available allocations. If an allocation is Pareto optimal, there do
not exist changes in regulatory policies that yield benefits for all.
Conversely, if an allocation is not Pareto optimal, there is a
reallocation of resources that improves each individual's position.
Some regulatory policy options cannot be evaluated using the
Pareto optimality criterion since the beneficiaries of the policy
choices may vary from option to option. Then it is appropriate
to compare net benefits. It may be desirable to maximize total net
benefits if it is feasible for winners financially to compensate
losers. Otherwise, policymakers must seek alternative means of
comparing the welfare effects of policy decisions.
Changes in regulatory policies create winners and losers. In
particular, competitive entry may improve the position of large
110. See, e.g., Knieps & Spiller. Deregulating by Partial Deregulation: The Case of
TeLecommunications, 35 ADMlN. L. REv. 391, 391-92 (1983).
111. Knieps & Spiller find that in the case of FCC deregulation of interstate toll
service, "partial deregulation is a temporary strategy" that allows the FCC to learn about
new technology such as satellite transmission. Id. at 395.
112. See, e.g., the case study presented in Part IV, infra.
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industrial customers seeking to bypass the regulated utility while
creating welfare losses for captive customers who face higher
prices after entry. Policymakers inevitably compare gains and
losses, weighting them on the basis of various considerations,
including the preferences of regulators, the political influence of
the winners and losers, and the ability of market participants to
communicate with the regulators. If bypass leads to a price
increase for captive customers and a price drop for switching
customers, the regulator must evaluate the welfare effects in
formulating regulatory policy toward entry.
B. Capacity Expansion and Industry Costs
The effects of entry on productive capacity and total industry
costs are an important aspect of bypass. The main issues are
whether costly duplication of existing capacity will occur and
whether total costs will rise or fall after entry. Evaluating the
desirability of entry is somewhat different from determining an
optimal industry structure in the absence of existing capacity.
Because investments in capacity are irreversible, a reviewing
agency must determine whether potential reductions in operating
costs are sufficient to justify the construction costs of new
capacity. Bypass simply may involve a shift of customers from one
firm to another without any significant expansion in capacity. For
example, large industrial customers of natural gas companies or
electricity transmission companies that are located on the bound-
ary of service areas may simply connect to a competing transmis-
sion system."' The consequences may reflect price adjustments, an
export of excess capacity from one transmission system to
another, or both. If customers are able to connect simultaneously
to competing systems, they obtain insurance benefits from the
backup facilities." 4 This arrangement can be efficient only if the
customer pays for the backup services. Just as sunk costs should
not determine private decisionmaking, so regulatory decisions
113. In southern California, oil companies engaged in enhanced oil recovery seek
alternative supplies of natural gas from companies both inside and outside southern
California. See infra Part IV. The possibility of competition between electric utilities to serve
large industrial consumers and fringe areas is discussed in P. Josxow & R. SCI[MMZNS.E,
supra note 2, at 21. They find it to be a relatively unimportant phenomenon except in
growing service areas.
114. MacAvoy, Economic Effects of Bypass: A Case Study in the Natural Gas Industry
3 (June 7. 1988) (Statement Regarding H.R. 4089, The Natural Gas Transition Act of 1988)
(on file with authors).
Yale Journal on Regulation
about entry should not consider past capital outlays. In setting
regulatory policy toward entry, the imputed costs of alternative
policies should reflect the entrant's and incumbent's future costs,
not the incumbent's sunk costs. A firm's costs are divided into
fixed installation and subsequent variable operating expenditures.
Annual operating expenses include resource costs, such as natural
gas purchases, and management costs. For a given time horizon,",
the present discounted value of variable costs can be calculated
given projected operating levels and input factor prices. For
example, assume that variable costs are determined on the basis
of a constant maintained capacity for each service offered. In
addition, assume that the incumbent serves two customer classes
with outputs q, and q2, respectively. Let VA(ql,q) represent the
incumbent firm's present discounted value of variable costs at
outputs q, and q2. The potential entrant, firm B, wishes to serve
customer class 2. The expected present discounted value of the
entrant's variable costs is represented by V'(q,). In addition to
variable costs, the entrant must first make an irreversible invest-
ment in transmission facilities before it can serve customers in the
market. The entrant's construction costs are represented by K'
and depend upon the projected capacity in the new market, in
this case q,. The entrant's variable cost function, VB(q2), and
capital construction costs, KB, are jointly determined since the
transmission technology chosen will affect the firm's operating
costs. It is reasonable to assume that present discounted variable
costs and capital construction costs reflect efficient, cost-minimiz-
ing input combinations for the new entrant.
The proper test for choosing whether the incumbent firm or
the entrant should provide the service involves a comparison of
these costs with and without bypass. If the bypass is approved,
the total costs will then equal the sum of the following three
elements: (1) the incumbent's variable costs of serving customer
class 1 and any change in variable costs to provide service to
other customer classes; (2) the entrant's variable costs of serving
customer class 2; and (3) the entrant's capital construction costs.
Entry is socially desirable only if the total costs of service after
115. An important issue for consideration is the relevant time horizon over which
costs should be measured. The variable cost of the incumbent should not exceed the
productive life of the incumbent's capital equipment unless allowances are made for
replacement or upgrading of facilities. The relevant time horizon fbr the new entrant is
the shorter of the period of amortization of the entrant's new capital equipment or the
length of a typical contract with a customer.
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bypass are less than the costs without entry. In this example, the
cost of service without entry equals V(q,,q2). If entry takes place
and the entrant serves all of customer class 2, post-entry variable
costs plus capital costs equal:
VA(q,,O) + VB(q2) + KM .
Entry is efficient only if:
VA(q,,O) + V(q 2) +K" < VA(ql,q 2). (1)
Stated differently, if the incumbent's cost of serving its remaining
customers plus the entrant's variable and capital costs are less
than the incumbent's variable cost of service without entry, the
bypass is efficient and should be approved.
Now, assume that the entrant and the incumbent incur the
same variable costs in serving market 2; that is, VA(O,q 2) =
V(q 2). If the incumbent has variable costs that exhibit economies
of scope, the sum of the stand-alone costs of separately serving
each customer class will exceed the total costs of jointly serving
all customer classes."" Therefore, it will never be worthwhile to
permit entry. This statement holds true even if there are no
construction costs required of the entrant.
The presence of initial capital cost, K', makes the requirement
for efficient entry even more stringent. Assume that the incum-
bent's costs exhibit economies of scope. The entrant's total stand-
alone cost must be sufficiently below the incumbent's incremental
costs to compensate for the loss of economies of scope. Stated
differently, increased efficiency in operations must be sufficiently
great to compensate for the additional capital costs. The cost test
in equation (1) can be written as follows:
[V(ql,q 2) - V(q,,O)] - VO(q 2) > K. (2)
The term in brackets is the incumbent firm's incremental variable
cost of serving customer class 2. It is not enough for the
entrant's stand-alone costs to be less than the incumbent's
116. Economies of scope are said to exist if:
V(q,,q2) < V'(q,O) + VA(O,q2).
See W. BAUMOL. J. PswAR & R. WILLIG, supra note 65, at 71.
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incremental variable costs of serving user group 2 for the bypass
to be considered efficient. Thus, the cost test for assessing the
efficiency of entry may also be stated as follows: the incumbent's
incremental variable costs must exceed the entrant's variable costs
by an amount greater than the entrant's construction costs.
Otherwise, bypass raises the total costs of service.
In principle, there are three possible responses of a utility to
a partial entrant's bypass in a portion of its market: (1) profits
will fall; (2) costs will be reduced internally; or (3) the remaining
(captive) customers will be forced to bear higher rates for the
same quality of service. Although it is true that all of these
options are possible, they are by no means equally likely to occur.
If total returns diminished as selective entry ate away at a
historically profitable market, investor confidence would erode.
Shareholders would be forced to bear the costs of bypass as the
return on their investment fell. These increased risks to investors
would be reflected in higher future capital costs for the utility
when it sought to finance new investments, which would adversely
affect the financial viability of the utility. Thus, although reducing
profits is a possible response to bypass, it would appear to be an
unlikely choice on the part of the utility.
Alternatively, the utility may try to reduce costs and maintain
profits at their pre-bypass level. This could be done either by
increasing efficiency or by reducing service quality. If the
incumbent is operating at or close to a loss already, lower service
quality would be the likeliest result."7 If investors are not forced
to bear the costs of bypass, and the quality of service is main-
tained, captive customers will inevitably face higher rates after the
bypass. This is due both to the loss of economies of scope and to
the necessity of covering joint and common costs previously
expected to be recovered in the bypass sector. Thus, revenue
requirements for remaining customers would increase. The
greater the difference between revenues and stand-alone costs of
a service class before entry, the higher the rate increases after
entry. In other words, the utility's remaining customers must
cover the difference between the revenues formerly received from
the bypass customers and the incremental cost of serving those
customers.
117. See Joskow. supra note 9. at 312-14. Joskow examines instances of regulated
utilities operating at a loss.
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C. Prices and Welfare
An assessment of the welfare effects of entry requires a
comparison with the rate structure in effect before deregulation.
This comparison determines the extent to which deregulation
creates winners and losers. A crucial issue is whether the rate
structure reflects social policy or whether established rates arise
as arbitrary outcomes of the regulatory process. To the extent
that the rate structure reflects social policy, entry may render
pricing goals unattainable. Conversely, if the rate structure
reflects cross-subsidies that policymakers view as undesirable,
competition will mitigate these price distortions.
The regulated rate structure may reflect efforts to select
efficient prices. Ramsey prices maximize a measure of social
welfare subject to a break-even constraint for the regulated
firm."' The social welfare measure is a weighted sum of consumer
net benefits. The weights reflect either regulatory preferences or
the outcome of bargaining with customer representatives in rate
hearings."1 The resulting rate structure depends on the relative
size of the welfare weights and on the effects of price changes on
consumer net benefits. The Ramsey price formula equates the
relative markup (price minus marginal cost divided by price) to
the reciprocal of demand elasticity times an adjustment factor.
The adjustment factor depends on the relative welfare weights
and the shadow price on the break-even constraint.2 0 Therefore,
118. Ramsey pricing is named for Frank Ramsey, who examined optimal taxation.
Ramsey, A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation, 37 ECON. J. 47 (1927). Boiteux presented
the first analysis of second-best pricing in a general framework. Boiteux, Sur ia Gestion des
Monopoles Publics Astremnts a l'Equilibre Budgetaire. 24 EcoNOMErmcA 22 (1956). translated as
Boiteux, On the Management of Public Monopolies Subject to Budgetary Constraints, 3 J. EcoN.
THEoRy 219 (1971). See also D. SpuLaER, supra note 6, at 131-33; Phillips, Ramsey Pricing and
Sustainability with Interdependent Demands, in REGutATED INDUSTRIEs, supra note 90. at 187, 188-
90; Baumol & Bradford, Optimal Departures from Marginal Cost Pricing, 60 Am. EcoN. Rtv. 265
(1970). The general definition of efficient prices is based on the Pareto optimality criterion.
119. The welfare weights are applied in practice to the net benefits of customer
classes (i.e., residential, commercial, and industrial) and they need not be equal. A particular
set of welfare weights is associated with each second-best Pareto-optimal price vector. The
welfare weights need not be explicitly chosen by regulators, but their existence may be
inferred from rate structure decisions.
120. Suppose that there are two customer classes (e.g., residential and industrial) with
demands D1(p1) and D3(p) respectively. Let C(q,,q) be the production cost of supplying
outputs q, and q2 to the two customer classes. Then, the regulated firm's profits are defined
by
r(pzpO = p1Dl(p1) + pgD,(p1) - C(D1(p1), Dx(pl)).
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the rate structure, given by relative markups across customer
classes, reflects the set of welfare weights and demand elasticities.
Prices are set such that customer classes with relatively inelastic
demand bear a greater share of joint costs. A greater welfare
weight placed on residential customers can lower prices to those
customers and raise them to commercial and industrial customers.
Regulated rate structures can involve cross-subsidies that
provide incentives for entry.121 If a customer class has relatively
inelastic demand or a relatively smaller welfare weight, rates may
be set such that its share of costs exceeds the stand-alone costs
of serving that customer class. Even with equal welfare weights,
sufficiently inelastic demand can cause a customer class to
subsidize other customer classes. Alternatively, cross-subsidies can
result from regulatory decisions that reflect greater concern with
the net benefit to some customer class.
Even uniform Ramsey pricing can involve cross-subsidies.
Figure 1 illustrates this possibility. The average cost curve (AC)
represents the technology available to both incumbent firms and
entrants. DR represents residential demand, D' represents indus-
trial demand, and DR + D' represents total market demand. At
the price p, the regulated firm serving the entire market breaks
even. The average cost price is also the Ramsey price in the one-
product case. The output levels QR and Q' represent the total
sales to the residential and industrial customers respectively at the
regulated price p. The average stand-alone cost of providing
service Q' to the industrial customers is AU'. The total revenues
Let S.(p,) and S,(po be the customer classes. Then, the welfare measure is defined by:
W(p,,p') = S(p) + MOO)
where X is a welfare weight. The price vector (P'I,P'*) is a Ramsey-Boiteux price vector if
it solves:
max W(p1.p,) subject to n(p,.pl) > 0.
Pi 'Pt
The first order conditions are t(p°,p'%) = 0, and
(p1 - CO)/p, = [(y - 1) / y)](l/r 1 ),
(p, - C,)/p, = [( - X) //)l(1/n,).
where nb = -D'1(pi)pDi(pJ, i = 1,2 is the elasticity of demand for each customer class.
121. The possibility that Ramsey prices involve cross-subsidies, even with equal welfare
weights, is widely noted. See, e.g., D. SPUL.BER, supra note 6, at 131-33.
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generated by industrial customers, pQ', exceed the stand-alone
costs of serving those customers, AC'Q', by an amount equal to
the shaded area in Figure 1. Therefore, the industrial customers
subsidize the purchases of the residential customers who provide





The existence of cross-subsidies creates opportunities for entry.
Opening the market represented in Figure 1 to competition
inevitably would result in lower prices to industrial customers and
higher prices to residential customers even if the incumbent firm
were able to deter entry. Bypass cannot be justified if the existing
rate structure yields greater welfare than would the competitive
rate structure. If the incumbent firm in Figure 1 were restricted
in its ability to respond to competition, new firms would enter to
serve the industrial customers. Assume that this bypass were
inefficient under the cost test developed above." 2 The total
payments by residential and industrial customers of the incumbent
would rise to cover these costs, to the extent that regulators
permit cost recovery by the incumbent. As a result, the primary
effects of bypass on customers remaining on the local utility
122. See supra notes 114-17 and accompanying text.
AC
DR + DI
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system are rate increases that recapture the lost net revenues
formerly provided by those who left. As the remaining customers
cut back on natural gas usage in response to a price increase, the
joint costs must be covered on sales revenues from a smaller
output base. As total output declines, average costs per unit rise,
since the total overhead costs remain constant. Therefore, the rate
increases borne by the remaining customers must meet the
incumbent's revenue requirement.
If the existing rate schedule achieves the goals that regulation
is designed to accomplish, entry that changes this schedule will
have a negative impact on social welfare. Accounting for these
welfare effects requires a test that determines the impact of
bypass on an LDC's remaining customers. A monetary measure of
the welfare loss attributable to the increase in prices resulting
from bypass can be developed by quantifying the change in
consumer surplus. Consumer surplus represents the difference
between the total value consumers receive from the consumption
of a particular good and the total amount that they pay for it. 2 '
In essence, this calculation seeks to identify the hypothetical
change in general purchasing power necessary to make consumers
indifferent to bypass.
IV. Natural Gas and Bypass: A Case Study
The desirability of entry under partial deregulation in indus-
tries such as natural gas can be determined only from a case-by-
case review of the facts. In the preceding Parts, we outlined the
underpinnings of a framework for evaluating the desirability of
particular bypass proposals. In this Part, the framework is applied
to the enhanced oil recovery (EOR) market in Kern County,
California. 2 4 To evaluate the desirability of entry in such a case,
123. In practice, the change in consumer surplus can be calculated under certain
conditions as the area to the left of the demand curve for natural gas between the pre-
and post-bypass prices. See Willig. Consumer Surplus WitWut Apology. 66 AM. ECON. REV. 589.
591-92 (1976).
124. Enhanced Oil Recovery is a steam injection technology used to extract heavy
crude oil. In part because of air quality standards, development of EOR operations has
been tied to increased use of natural gas as fuel for producing steam in cogeneration
projects. The Southern California Gas Company forecasts that the demand for natural gas
by EOR customers in Kern County will equal approximately 600 million cubic feet of gas
per day (MMCFD) at its peak in 1995.
The data and analysis contained in this section draw from P. MacAvoy, An Analysis of
the Effect of Bypass by Potential Entering Pipelines into California Natural Gas Distribution
Markets: Competition Is Not Always Better (Report submitted as testimony before the
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two complementary tests should be used: (1) the cost test
described earlier, based on economic efficiency considerations;'
and (2) a social welfare test that examines the impact on cus-
tomers remaining after bypass.
A. The Cost Test in the EOR Market
In response to the potential for large increases in gas demand
by EOR customers in Kern County, two applications were filed
with FERC to construct major interstate pipelines to deliver gas
for use in the EOR operations.' 6 In April 1985, Mojave Pipeline
Company requested approval of a $270 million project designed
to deliver 600 million cubic feet of gas per day (MMCFD).127 In
May 1985, Kern River Gas Transmission Company requested
approval of a pipeline that would deliver 700 MMCFD at an
estimated construction cost of over $714 million. 8 The local
utilities involved, Southern California Gas and Pacific Gas and
Electric, responded that they had in place essentially all of the
capacity needed to meet demand forecasted for the coming
decade." 9
Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n in the matter of Mojave Pipeline Co., Docket No.
CP85-437, Exhibit SG-3) (on file with authors). The authors assisted Southern California Gas
Company in the Mojatv case. However, the opinions and condusions reached herein do not
necessarily reflect the views of Southern California Gas Company.
125. See supra notes 114-17 and accompanying text.
126. P. MacAvoy, supra note 124, at 11-13. The applications have been consolidated
into a single proceeding. For a general statement of the scope of the proceeding, see
Mojave Pipeline Co., 35 Fed Reg. Energy Comm'n Rep. (CCH) 61,199 (May 19, 1986)
(Docket Nos. CP85-437 et al.) (order consolidating proceeding for comparative hearing).
127. P. MacAvoy, supra note 124, at 12. To deliver this amount of gas, the Mojave
project requires additional interconnections and looping provided by the El Paso Natural
Gas Company (El Paso) and the Transwestern Pipeline Company (Transwestern). "El Paso
is proposing to construct an additional 14 miles of pipeline so as to be able to provide
400 MMCFD to Mojave. The cost of this construction is approximately $11 million.
Transwestern is proposing to construct over 357 miles of pipeline which will provide 320
MMCFD to Mojave at a cost of $200 million." Id. at 12-13.
128. Id. at 12. For Kern River to provide its designated service to the EOR market.
Northwest Pipeline Corporation (Northwest) must build an interconnection with Kern River.
The estimated construction cost of this interconnection is over $i million. Both Mojave and
Kern River submitted variations to their "base case" pipelines. For example, the Mojave
options included pipelines that would deliver between 400 to 600 MMCFD; the Kern River
alternatives include pipelines with capacities of 400 to 1000 MMCFD.
129. Id. at 11. The analysis in this Part is predicated on the existence of sufficient
capacity in place If large investments in capacity are required, estimates of the incumbent's
costs will rise. This can reverse the outcome of the cost test and lead to a different
recommendation.
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Kern River and Mojave proposed to construct separate facilities
designed to serve only one customer class."'0 In a study conducted
for Southern California Gas Company, estimates were made of the
present value of stand-alone costs in 1986 dollars for the entrant
pipeline options.' The stand-alone costs of the entrants can be
compared to the incremental cost of incumbent service, under a
scenario of 600 MMCFD.52 The study shows that the present
value cost of incumbent service is approximately $142 million'
while that of the Kern River option is estimated to be $658
million.3 4 This amount includes the cost of the pipeline expansion
necessary to provide gas to meet the demand in Kern River's
application. The present value cost of the Mojave option is
approximately $568 million.' In present value terms, the
entrants' costs exceed the incumbent firms' cost by a factor of
from four to five. These differences amount to $425 million for
the Mojave proposal and $515 million for the Kern River option.
This analysis indicates that the resource costs of incumbent
service to the EOR market are significantly lower than those of
the proposed entrant pipelines. Entry by Kern River or Mojave
would not be in the interest of economic efficiency because total
costs would increase by several orders of magnitude. If for some
reason both pipelines were certified and built, the extra cost
would exceed $1 billion.
Witnesses for Mojave and Kern River claim that the cost
estimates present only part of the story. They argue that a
proper analysis must consider the benefits derived from bypass.3 8
However, as indicated earlier, in this case such benefits are to the
bypassing customer and thus do not produce economy-wide gains
130. Id. at 15.
131. The estimates include capital and operating costs.
132. This is the cost test that was developed supra notes 114-17 and accompanying
text, and summarized in equation (2), supra.
133. P. MacAvoy, supra note 124, at 48. These costs represent the variable operating
costs that Pacific Gas and Electric Company and the Southern California Gas Company
would incur. Because the utilities have estimated that they have the present capacity and
facilities to serve this market, additional construction costs are not required. Id. at 11. These
costs would be adjusted if any additions to capacity were required to meet demand.
134. Id. at 48.
135. The estimates assume a contract life of 15 years and a discount rate of 7.5%.
.136. Kenneth Heyer, Prepared Direct Testimony 10-11, 27-34 (Mar. 1987) (FERC
Docket Nos. CP85-437 et al., Exhibit No. DOJ-KH-1) (testimony on behalf of Antitrust
Division, U.S. Dep't of Justice) (on file with authors); Joseph Kalt, Prepared Rebuttal
Testimony 2-10, 15-20 (June 1987) (FERC Docket Nos. CP85-437 et al., Exhibit No. MP-
69) (testimony on behalf of Mojave Pipeline Co.) (on file with authors).
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because they are paid for by other customers. The entrants
merely provide the bypassing customer access to a second source
of supply that is now to be subsidized by the utilities' remaining
customers.' This is a significant aspect of the entry process. The
bypassing customer pays for the entrant's services but not for the
standby service from the LDCs. The standby service is provided
at regulated rates. Captive customers of the LDCs face higher
rates required to cover the joint system costs due to the loss of
service to the bypass customers. This need not always be the case.
In some instances the benefits from bypass may exceed the
additional costs imposed on captive customers. In the present
instance, bypass can provide positive benefits to both switching
and captive customers if capacity expansion is needed to meet
anticipated demand levels. In that case, certification of entry
would be desirable.
The payment of compensation for welfare losses resulting from
bypass is a separate issue. It is questionable whether bypassing
customers should bear the financial responsibility for the lower
demand of the LDC. Moreover, redistributive taxation does not
appear to be a proper undertaking for regulatory authorities. It
should be noted that joint ventures between an incumbent and an
entrant provide a means of sharing the costs of capacity expan-
sion without necessarily shifting all current capacity costs onto
existing customers.
B. A Welfare Test in the EOR Market
If bypass in the EOR market were permitted, our calculations
indicate that the remaining customers of the incumbent utility
would incur significant welfare losses. For example, it is estimated
that residential customers in 1995 would incur a welfare loss of
$18 million and nonresidential customers would incur a welfare
loss of $34 million.' Translating future losses into present value
137. Detailed calculations are available from the authors upon request. The
calculations employ a discount rate of 7.5%.
138. Welfare losses are measured in terms of the total loss in consumer surplus due
to a rise in the prices charged to the incumbent utility's captive customers. A comparison
is made between the prices charged by an incumbent that would deter entry in the absence
of incumbent burdens and the prices charged in the event of entry. If entry occurs, prices
rise for captive customers since the bypassing customers no longer cover a share of capital
costs. There are assumed to be no net benefits from entry in the sense that the bypassing
customers are charged the same prices in the entry deterrence case and the case with entry.
The loss is primarily attributed to the fact that captive customers bear the full costs of
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terms, the remaining customers would incur an estimated
aggregate welfare loss attributable to bypass of $421 million over
the years 1990 to 2004. There would be negligible compensating
gains to final consumers of petroleum products from bypass, since
EOR production would not affect petroleum product prices.
The end result of bypass, therefore, is that the bypasser would
receive added service from a dedicated pipeline and free back-
up access to the utility's system, all at the expense of remaining
customers who would be forced to pay higher rates to make up
the lost net revenues. If it is indeed true that bypass plus the
back-up services of the incumbent pipeline provide a "new
service," then those who benefit should be willing to pay for the
back-up service as well. Only when such compensation is provided
will a demand for "new service" have been validated in economic
policy. A case could be made for certifying Mojave or Kern River
if they were to provide compensation for reserved capacity to the
utilities to prevent rate increases for home consumers in southern
California. Under the existing regulatory framework, of course, no
such compensation is required.
Conclusion
The influence of rate regulation on the investment decisions
of regulated firms suggests that observed capacity levels depend
upon regulatory policies. At the same time, customer demand
patterns depend strongly on regulatory decisions. Regulatory
actions that create incentives for customer bypass and encourage
increased investment in capacity may be inconsistent. The
resulting excess capacity may lead to cost inefficiencies that
increase costs to consumers and reduce the returns on investment
in regulated markets. This possibility is referred to as uneconomic
bypass.
Existing rate structures and service requirements create
incumbent burdens that inhibit the existing firm's ability to
compete effectively with an entrant. The ultimate consequence
may be uneconomic bypass. Rate structures that result from
regulatory pursuit of welfare objectives can create economic
incentives for bypass. If revenues generated by a particular class
existing capacity, due to the loss of revenues from bypassing customers that is diverted to
pay for new capacity. If existing capacity were not adequate to meet demand at market
prices fbr delivered gas. then entry would generally result in a net welfare gain.
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of service exceed the stand-alone cost of a new pipeline, the
bypasser is able to profit by providing service to the market
segment providing the cross-subsidy. A commonly overlooked
feature of most bypass settings is that bypassing customers not
only receive the service that they purchase from the entrant, but
also obtain back-up service from the existing utility at no
substantial cost to them. While the industrial customer would
normally use the new entrant's bypassing transmission facilities,
in the event of system failure or contract breakdown, the
customer could return to the LDC and access its lines. Because
state regulation mandates the provision of service, the LDC
cannot refuse this request. The availability of this second-source
without charge substantially increases the reliability of the bypass
service.
Proponents of partial deregulation have recognized the
presence of incumbent burdens such as rate regulation and the
difficulty in making contractual commitments for regulated incum-
bents. Broadman and Kalt stress that the pressures created by
bypass will force the bypassed LDCs and the state regulatory
commission to shed these burdens by opting for redesign of rate
structures or by renegotiating long-term contracts. 3 ' Moreover,
they argue that competitive entry might spur the LDC into
providing higher service quality and achieving greater cost
efficiency.
Both considerations are certainly important in evaluating
applications for certification of new entrants. There is general
agreement that competition can enhance product quality and cost
efficiency. It is also likely that competition will create pressure on
LDCs and state regulators to change rate structures and other
regulatory policies. However, two issues remain. First, the
timetable for changes in state regulatory policy is not easy to
establish. If incumbent burdens are removed slowly, there will be
incentives for entry that will not reflect the long-run costs and
benefits of entry in the absence of regulation. The entrant may
establish costly permanent facilities in anticipation of gradual
deregulation. Thus, the resulting market equilibrium will not
correspond to that observed in an unfettered competitive market.
Second, it is not evident that rapid elimination of state regulation
is always desirable if the LDC technology exhibits the characteris-
139. See Broadman & Kalt, supra note 2, at 196-201. We thank John Yetter of the
YAE JouitNA oN REGuLmTON for this point.
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tics of a natural monopoly and the LDC possesses adequate
existing capacity. As we have emphasized, the allocative and
efficiency effects of such deregulation require careful consider-
ation.
A federal policy of more open access in an industry where
state agencies implement regulation will not reduce the burden
of excessive regulations; rather, it invites economic waste. There
may be no feasible pricing system that a utility can implement
under two sets of agencies. Thus, some entry controls may
continue to be necessary for efficient regulated markets. This
does not mean that inefficient utilities deserve protection from
entry. Rather, it suggests that each bypass application has to be
evaluated on a case-by-case basis. The cost test presented here"'
provides a means of examining whether duplication of facilities
will result from new entry. A welfare test, such as the one
considered in the preceding analysis141 can be used to determine
the effects of changes in rate structures that occur in response to
actual or potential entry. These tests could be included as part of
a general framework used to evaluate bypass proposals on a case-
by-case basis.
At the same time, it is important to recognize the high
administrative and transaction costs involved with evaluating
bypass on a case-by-case basis. Regulatory commissions may be
inundated with a large number of competing applications of a
complex technical nature. The choice among the candidates for
certification necessarily reflects the somewhat arbitrary consider-
ations involved in evaluating applications and may also reflect the
preferences of and information available to regulators. Addition-
ally, market mechanisms for the allocation of franchises or the
right to serve may yield benefits from competition, but they can
be costly and difficult to implement. 4  Finally, certification
hearings are frequently lengthy and can delay even desirable
entry. The transaction costs associated with certification proce-
dures should be weighed against the welfare effects and capital
costs associated with bypass of existing facilities. This comparison
140. See supra notes 114-17 and accompanying text.
141. See supra Part IV.B.
142. For a discussion of difficulties in competitive franchise allocation, see Williamson,
Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies-In General and with Respect to CATV 7 BELL J. EcON.
73 (1976). See also D. SPULBER, supra note 6, at 252-64 (proposing model that corrects
difficulties with franchise bidding schemes).
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should be carried out in the context of a re-evaluation of federal
and state regulatory policy.
In formulating regulatory policy toward entry, it is important
to determine whether the market mechanism is allowed to
function or whether competition is impeded. If partial deregula-
tion or re-regulation imposes either entry barriers or incumbent
burdens, the resulting competitive entry need not yield efficient
decisions about prices, product quality, investment, or innovation.
Experimenting with competitive entry, while maintaining rate
regulation or common carrier obligations, can yield market
outcomes that are less efficient than those found under full
regulation. Investment decisions and contractual agreements made
during the transition to a market with reduced regulation can
have significant effects on the future structure of the industry.
Entry can provide many benefits, but it can also result in costly
excess capacity and in rate structure changes with substantial
adverse welfare effects. As deregulation policy continues to evolve
for the natural gas industry, as well as for the electricity and
telecommunications industries, it is important to remember the
potential costs of competitive entry.

